Buying that first house had a snowball effect. Almost immediately, Mitch and Gina bought two adjacent lots for even less and, with the help of friends and local youngsters, dug in a garden. Then they bought the house next door for $500, reselling it to a pair of local artists for a $50 profit. When they heard about the $100 place down the street, they called their friends Jon and Sarah.
It’s worth noting, also, that invariably stories that mention the prospect of foreclosure talk about the hit that this causes to a borrowers’ credit rating. Obviously, there is a hit. However, journalists are mistaken when they imagine that a credit score is a judgment on the character of borrowers. It’s not. It’s a judgment about the likelihood of someone repaying a loan. Bad marks like a foreclosure affect this. But being overextended on credit affects this even more. You might imagine that if you have the magic word “foreclosure” on your record you are automatically a worse risk than someone who doesn’t. That’s just not true. Lenders don’t like to lend money to people who have not paid their debts in the past. But what they like even less is lending money to people who have a mortgage they can’t afford and are likely to stop paying their debts in the future.
The median price of a home sold in Detroit in December was $7,500, according to Realcomp, a listing service.
Not $75,000. Remove a zero—it’s seven thousand five hundred dollars, substantially less than the lowest-price car on the new-car market.
(thx Kalid!)
Because America’s tendency to overconsume and under-save has been intimately intertwined with our postwar spatial fix—that is, with housing and suburbanization—the shape of the economy has been badly distorted, from where people live, to where investment flows, to what’s produced. Unless we make fundamental policy changes to eliminate these distortions, the economy is likely to face worsening handicaps in the years ahead.
Suburbanization—and the sprawling growth it propelled—made sense for a time. The cities of the early and mid-20th century were dirty, sooty, smelly, and crowded, and commuting from the first, close-in suburbs was fast and easy. And as manufacturing became more technologically stable and product lines matured during the postwar boom, suburban growth dovetailed nicely with the pattern of industrial growth. Businesses began opening new plants in green-field locations that featured cheaper land and labor; management saw no reason to continue making now-standardized products in the expensive urban locations where they’d first been developed and sold. Work was outsourced to then-new suburbs and the emerging areas of the Sun Belt, whose connections to bigger cities by the highway system afforded rapid, low-cost distribution…
But that was then; the economy is different now. It no longer revolves around simply making and moving things. Instead, it depends on generating and transporting ideas. The places that thrive today are those with the highest velocity of ideas, the highest density of talented and creative people, the highest rate of metabolism. Velocity and density are not words that many people use when describing the suburbs. The economy is driven by key urban areas; a different geography is required.
If you’re familiar with Kunstler, then you’re familiar with a lot of the background.
His solutions:
The solution begins with the removal of homeownership from its long-privileged place at the center of the U.S. economy. Substantial incentives for homeownership (from tax breaks to artificially low mortgage-interest rates) distort demand, encouraging people to buy bigger houses than they otherwise would… If anything, our government policies should encourage renting, not buying. Homeownership occupies a central place in the American Dream primarily because decades of policy have put it there. … [A recent study] shows that, controlling for income and demographics, homeowners are no happier than renters, nor do they report lower levels of stress or higher levels of self-esteem.
I definitely agree, but this will never happen. Any politician who tries will be quickly out of a job.
Nobody likes a naysayer. Watch as Peter Schliff gets yelled at by every one for trying to say the market will go down. (thx paul)
[Government’s] only goal is to keep voters happy. After supposedly bailing out the fat cats on Wall Street, no politician wants to be accused of evicting struggling families. Once you understand this, all of your anxiety should melt away. Why pay your mortgage if foreclosure is off the table, and if you know that lower payments, and possibly a reduced loan amount, would result? A tarnished a credit rating is a small price to pay for such a benefit.
Ha, ha, only serious. (via HN)
For the past few years, the Inland Empire in Riverside County has been one of the fastest growing counties in the state - home to a major housing boom. But now the Inland Empire is pretty much the poster child for the foreclosure crisis. SoCal Connected tracked down some surreal sights associated with the crisis, including a guy who started a business turning abandoned, dead lawns green - with spray-paint.
Watch homes that are deserted before foreclosure. Leaving behind furniture, electronics, etc. (thx nima)
Michael Lewis rents a ridiculous mansion in New Orleans for $13,000 / month (roughly the cost of a two-bedroom apartment here in New York).
Utilities were $2,700. That turned out not to include water, which was another $1,000. Think of it: $1,000 a month for water you don’t drink. (The drinking water came in truckloads from a spring-water company.)
Later:
It’s no good pretending that Americans didn’t know they couldn’t afford such properties, or that they were seduced into believing they could afford them by mendacious mortgage brokers or Wall Street traders. If they hadn’t lusted after the bigger house, they never would have met the mortgage brokers in the first place. The money-lending business didn’t create the American desire for unaffordable housing. It simply facilitated it.
(via kottke)
Great talk from 2006 that predicts a lot of the current mess. (part 6 is also worth it)
An excellent explanation of Fannie & Freddie’s history, and why they’re in trouble.
Fannie Mae’s original role was to buy mortgages from individual banks, package them up into securities, guarantee those securities against loss, and then sell them to other financial institutions. However once Fannie Mae realized that the “golden goose” allowed them to buy those same securities for its own portfolio and lock-in “risk free” profits, Fannie became a major buyer of its own securities. Fannie Mae was thus in the rather bizarre position of guaranteeing an ever increasing portion of its own assets against default.
[By the mid-1990’s] Fannie Mae had become one of the largest buyers of its own securities. Its stock was up over 40X from it’s 1980s nadir and it seemed as though the single biggest problem it had was deciding on how much money it wanted to make. This was a bigger problem than you might imagine because as a quasi-government agency, and a constant political football, Fannie Mae realized it couldn’t be seen to be abusing its market position. So rather than go crazy and buy every mortgage security in sight, Fannie Mae just settled on charting a nice predictable upward growth in earnings fueled largely by buying an ever increasing share of its own securities.
Now a normal private company could not pursue this strategy because as it issued more and more debt to fund the golden goose, the yields on the incremental debt would start to increase to the point where the strategy no longer made sense. But Fannie Mae was different. Because of the implicit government guarantee of its debt, Fannie could issue incremental debt with little or no regard to its existing debt load because everyone assumed the federal government would backstop the debt.
Fannie Mae’s only significant problem thus became that the supply of mortgage securities would prove insufficient to fund its projected earnings growth (which was well above the projected growth in mortgage debt). As a result Fannie began a series of largely successful political campaigns to increase the volume of mortgage securities available to fund their habit.
… Traditionally, Fannie had required the mortgages it purchased to be so-called 80/20 mortgages wherein the borrower puts at least a 20% down payment on the mortgage. This was a requirement because residential mortgages in the US are a “no-recourse” loan in which the borrow can generally “walk away” from the loan with no recourse to the lender other than seizing the house and reporting the default to a credit agency. A 20% down payment was generally thought to be enough to dramatically limit the moral hazard of borrowers “walking away” because housing values would have to decline 20%+ for the borrower to be underwater
… Fannie Mae began a campaign to increase “home ownership” and “affordability”. It created a home ownership “foundation” which opened offices in almost every congressional district and promptly set about mobilizing all the local advocates for “affordable” housing to put pressure on their elected representatives to let Fannie Mae offer “affordable housing programs”. Of course, “affordable housing problems” was just a euphemism for allowing Fannie Mae to lower its underwriting standards so that more mortgages could be created and the golden goose could thus kick out more golden eggs.
